Introduction
In the recent decision of Advocaten voor de Wereld,1 the Court of Justice has upheld the validity of the European arrest warrant and has given its imprimatur to the new surrender procedures replacing traditional extradition systems and key principles of national constitutional law and extradition law, such as dual criminality. This decision comes at an important time as the use of the surrender procedure rises exponentially in the Member States, nearly three years into its operation.2 The European arrest warrant has been considered on a number of occasions by the Irish Supreme Court recently in several unsuccessful challenges on fundamental rights and procedural grounds and the number of individuals surrendered to other States by the Irish courts during this time has also increased dramatically.3 However, the Irish courts have been denied access to the Court Seeds of a major supremacy dispute relating to fundamental rights have of course famously been sown in the past in respect of Ireland and the Court of Justice as to the abortion controversy.5 It does not appear that any such saga however will result from the European arrest warrant in Irish law. In a major constitutional development, the Court of Justice in its landmark decision in Pupino6 has recently transferred its longstanding First pillar caselaw on the obligations of Members State courts to interpret national law in light of European Union law, to the Third Pillar, thereby extending its own jurisdiction beyond that contemplated by the Treaties.7 This decision has proven itself to be of major importance in the Irish context, it would seem, where the national courts have been content in more caselaw to use Pupino to -bridge the gap‖ in the absence of a means to refer questions to the Court of Justice.8 But the issue remains: what should a national Supreme Court do to protect fundamental rights when it is unable itself to refer questions to the Court of Justice? Does an uncritical application of Pupino solve this difficulty? And what measures can legitimately be inserted in domestic implementation laws to -bridge the gap‖ further, for example to protect fundamental rights in the realm of the Third Pillar under national constitutional law?9 The Irish jurisprudence on extradition had traditionally been particularly favourable to the accused and had an illustrious history of being acutely conscious of potential human rights violations.10 This jurisprudence, however, has been disavowed with the enactment of the arrest warrant procedure. -… there must be not only a correspondence of offences but also a correspondence of fair procedures. No procedure to which the extradited person could be exposed may be one which, if followed in this State, would be condemned as being unconstitutional.‖ This article considers recent developments in the Irish Supreme Court, where the surrender procedures have been subject of much analysis recently and in particular where fundamental rights objections have been rejected despite a legal framework existing to accommodate such disputes.
The European arrest warrant and Irish law
It is important to note that Ireland had not been consulted initially about the content of the European arrest warrant11 and the removal of the need for -dual criminality‖ as contained in the European arrest warrant had at the outset presented a major challenge to key aspects of Irish caselaw on extradition existing for many decades. to -bridge the gap‖, using it to construe the Framework Decision that they are unable to seek further interpretive assistance with.21 Whether in fact the Irish courts have construed the national implementation legislation as to the arrest warrant contra legem as a result of their uncritical adherence to Pupino remains a difficult question, considered below.
The European arrest warrant in the Irish Supreme Court: Leading Decisions
The Supreme Court has dismissed a range of recent challenges in surrender proceedings. A number of practical difficulties have emerged in this area and been resolved in the absence of a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice to resolve the questions posed. The caselaw of the Irish Supreme Court is considered here under four headings: (1) fundamental fights objections to surrender proceedings, (2) evidential aspects of the arrest warrant procedure, (3) time limits in arrest warrant proceedings and (4) access to justice in surrender proceedings
Fundamental rights objections in surrender proceedings
The Supreme Court has rejected all challenges on fundamental rights grounds in surrender proceedings, despite the express inclusion of s. 37 into the implementation legislation. It would appear that the relevance and utility of s. 37 is now highly questionable, it having been -read down‖ most significantly, despite the judicial lacuna remaining. In the first Supreme Court decision examining the operation of s. -Escaping from lawful custody is a common law offence and triable before a Judge and jury. It is punishable by a term of imprisonment and a fine. The term is not prescribed and is at the discretion of the Judge. As it is a common law offence, the maximum term of imprisonment that a Judge can impose is life.‖ protected right in Irish law, relying inter alia on s. 37. Murray C.J. for the Court24 held that while the surrender process was subject to constitutional scrutiny, the national courts remained subject to the Pupino interpretive obligation. Murray C.J. held that it could not have been the intention of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) in enacting s. 37 that the surrender of individuals would be refused if the manner in which a trial in the requested State would be carried out did not conform to the Constitution. He remarked that he was:
-… not aware of any authority for the principle that the extradition or surrender of a person to a foreign country would contravene the Constitution simply because their legal system and system of trial differed from ours as envisaged by the Constitution.‖ However, Murray CJ was prepared to admit of some -egregious circumstances such as a clearly established and fundamental defect in the system of justice‖ in the issuing State that would warrant a refusal of surrender pursuant to s. 37, that the Court was not prepared to speculate as to, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. What is thus unmistakable as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Brennan is that the potential use to which s. 37 can be put is restricted to all but the most extreme or -egregious‖ of situations, ostensibly contrary to the intention of parliament. Whether such an instance may in fact ever result remains another question. 
Evidential aspects of the arrest warrant procedure
The challenges to the arrest warrant arising in the Irish Supreme Court in the area of evidential aspects of the warrant are particularly important in so far as they bear upon both fundamental rights and procedural matters equally and may affect the uniformity of the operation of the arrest warrant in Europe generally. Supreme Court, per Denham J.,31 employing ordinary canons of statutory interpretation, held that there was no requirement that the undertaking -given‖ had in fact to be made by the issuing authority and thus that the undertakings given complied fully with the Act. Moreover, the Court held that the adequacy of the evidence against the person sought was not a matter for consideration in surrender proceedings under the Act, thereby overturning the Court below. That there is no necessity to establish a prima facie case against an individual for them to be surrendered is a striking conclusion indeed, in the absence of clarification from the Court of Justice and the Supreme Court has thus disavowed decades of its own caselaw in the realm of extradition. Whilst probably correct, this conclusion flows directly from the consequences of full mutual recognition and not due process law and practice.
To similar effect in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Altaravicius32 a net point of law arose for consideration in the Supreme Court relating to the entitlement of a person subject to surrender to request the domestic warrant on foot of which an arrest warrant is issued. Thus, there the Supreme Court allowed an appeal against a High Court decision ordering a copy of the warrant for surrender from Lithuania to be produced before the Irish High Court, on the grounds of fair procedures and Recital 12 of the Framework Decision.33 The Supreme Court thus held that the European arrest warrant was based on mutual recognition and respect between judicial authorities and could not require an underlying warrant to be produced where neither the Act nor the Framework Decision explicitly so required. There was, as Denham J. described it, a -presumption‖ that the underlying documents were in order, pursuant to s. 4A of the Act of 2003, 34 which an individual could seek to rebut, thereby disentitling them to go on a general -fishing expedition‖. If this were not the case, Denham J. held, this would defeat the development that the European arrest warrant was, that of international co-operation predicated on mutual trust and judicial co-operation.35 Once again this outcome here flows logically from mutual recognition but the conclusion is reached in the absence of a consultation of the Court of Justice. Notably, the decision is delivered after Pupino but no reference is made thereto. Interestingly, Altaravicius is analogous to the recent decision of the House of Lords in Dabas v. High Court of Justice, Madrid36 discussed below, where a similar evidentiary request was dismissed.
-(1) … a person shall not be surrendered under this Act unless… (b) an undertaking in writing is given to the High Court by the issuing judicial authority that the person will not be proceeded against, sentenced, or detained … for an offence committed before his or her surrender other than the offence … specified in the European arrest warrant concerned. In Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Rodnov37 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against a decision of the High Court, where the individual subject to surrender had complained that the arrest warrant was bad on its face in that it had omitted a formula of words at the commencement of the form that were contained in the annex to the Framework Decision.38 Murray C.J., for the Court, held that while there had been a want of strict formal compliance in the particular warrant at issue, the defect was not -a want of formality which affected in any way the substance or effect of the European arrest warrant".39 Murray C.J. held that it would have been wholly unsatisfactory if the Court had to look for further information40 and rather a -common sense approach‖ had to be adopted as to challenges to the evidentiary formalities of the warrant. There is no reference to Pupino here, perhaps understandably given that it is an ex tempore decision of the Court and thus marked by extreme brevity. Surely this question was one worthy of a definitive answer from the highest European Court but there is again no mention of the inability of the Supreme Court to consult the Court of Justice on this important point of procedure and essential procedural questions are determined in isolation despite their impact on practice and the uniformity in operation of the instrument. -Where a judicial authority in an issuing state duly issues a European arrest warrant in respect of a person-(a) against whom that state intends to bring proceedings for the offence to which the European arrest warrant relates, or (b) on whom a sentence of imprisonment or detention has been imposed and who fled from the issuing state before he or she-(i) commenced serving that sentence, or (ii) completed serving that sentence, that person shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Framework Decision be arrested and surrendered to the issuing state.‖ 43 Interestingly, the Tampere European Council conclusions of 1999 and the recital to the Framework Decision were dismissed by Fennelly J. as inappropriate interpretive aids. restrictive interpretation adopted of the word -fled,‖ and the decision of the Court provoked much public outcry in Hungary. A decision of the Court of Justice as to the term -fled‖ would have been fruitful in such a difficult case as to the breadth of the Pupino interpretive obligation, given the likelihood of this issue arising in other Member State Courts in the future.
Time limits in surrender proceedings
The time limits that surrender proceedings are subject to remains a key procedural and fundamental rights question in so far as surrender proceedings are designed to be efficacious and judicially policed. -(10) If the High Court has not, after the expiration of 60 days from the arrest of the person concerned under section 13 or 14, made an order under this section or section 15 , or has decided not to make an order under this section, it shall direct the Central Authority in the State to inform the issuing judicial authority and … and the Central Authority in the State shall comply with such direction.
(11) If the High Court has not, after the expiration of 90 days from the arrest of the person concerned under section 13 or 14, made an order under this section or section 15 , or has decided not to make an order under this section, it shall direct the Central Authority in the State to inform extendable time limits in the Framework were, in her opinion, -a strongly worded recommendation,‖ but the processes remained subject to the fact that there was no mandatory time limit of 60 days prior to the final order for surrender in the same way as after the final order. While Denham J. held that it was unfortunate that it had not been possible to process the request more expeditiously, she concluded that the applicant had exercised his right of access to the courts -fully‖ through his extensive initiation of proceedings.
Geoghegan J. held it was quite likely that a sixty day period would be exceeded without fault in any European Member State where tiers of appellate courts were involved in the arrest warrant process. If he was wrong in this regard, Geoghegan J. held that a purposive approach applied to the Act of 2003 and that time taken up by proceedings instigated by the applicant had to be discounted from the time limits. Similarly, Fennelly J. considered the Court bound by the interpretive obligation set out in Pupino so as to arrive at the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court.49 Despite the extreme importance of this procedural point, the variety of ways in which the Supreme Court judges address the point raise worrisome questions once again as to uniformity of interpretation of the instrument and its implications for fundamental rights. Whether the Supreme Court is interpreting the national legislation contra legem remains unclear in the absence of clarification.
Access to the courts in surrender proceedings
Access to the courts is a fundamental right of tremendous importance in surrender proceedings given the fact that individuals are being pursued in this expeditious system between States through a judicial process. This area alone is one where the Supreme Court has reacted favorably to the subject of surrender proceedings. In the recent decision of Ó Fallúin v. Governor of Cloverhill,50 the Supreme Court decided an important point relating to detention powers and the right of access to justice of an individual in surrender proceedings The applicant in Ó Fallúin had been charged with conspiracy to defraud the UK Passport office and his surrender had been ordered by the Irish High Court, subject to a committal to prison pending the carrying out of the order for fifteen days.51 The Supreme Court there was asked to interpret in habeas corpus proceedings s. 16 (7) -… a person (to whom an order for the time being in force under this section applies) who is not surrendered to the issuing state in accordance with subsection (5), shall be released from custody but who was not in fact surrendered could be detained in custody pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. While the Act thus clearly provided for the immediate release of an individual in detention in the ordinary course, the Act had failed to provide for the scenario of the surrender decision being contested in the ordinary way in the appellate process through the Irish Courts. Thus the outcome of the decision was likely to have a profound effect on the liberty of those subject to surrender proceedings. The applicant in this case notably had failed to make a habeas corpus application for his release within the fifteen day period from the making High Court surrender order.
The Supreme Court per Fennelly J. concluded that the applicant had been in unlawful detention and that there was no necessary connection between the applicant's right to pursue his appeal and his right to liberty while it was pending. Rather the appeal did not depend on his detention in custody. S. 16 (7) -upon expiry of the time limits referred to in paragraph 2 [which provides for the ten-day period] to 4, if the person is still being held in custody he shall be released‖.
Fennelly J. held that the true meaning and intent of Article 23 had not been properly argued in the instant proceedings and so the Court would have to await a decision of the Court of Justice. In fact, the implementation of Article 23 of the Framework Decision in Irish law has received some criticism from the Commission.55 What again is noticeable is the absence of any comment from the Supreme Court to the effect that they had no ability to access the Court of Justice as to this important practical question and its operation in the Member State courts. The outcome of the Ó Fallúin decision at least is favourable to the accused. However, the result was obtained through the habeas corpus proceedings, a constitutionally enshrined remedy, that must be dealt with expeditiously as a matter of right.56 Again, the importance of access to the courts in this area would surely entail that the Court of Justice would be in a position to decide this important procedural question.
Analysis

Reading down s. 37 and using Pupino to "bridge the gap"
immediately upon the expiration of the 10 days referred to in subsection (5), unless, upon such expiration, proceedings referred to in subsection (6) are pending.‖ (emphasis supplied). 53 Meaning, approximately: -To say one thing is to exclude another‖. 54 Pursuant to the Pupino decision of the Court of Justice, which is not explicitly referred to in the decision of Fennelly J. but by implication is being referred to. A rigorous and critical application of the Pupino decision is of much importance in deciding whether a particular interpretation of implementing legislation is contra legem the Framework Decision. It is evident that the Irish Supreme Court has uncritically applied the Pupino decision. That such a divergence as to the application of Pupino has yet to arise in Ireland is thus most regrettable indeed.
Accepting the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice: The solution?
The political decision of the Irish State not to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 35 EU in this area, for reasons outwardly to do with sovereignty and control over the national legal system in criminal justice, is now proving to have major legal consequences. This decision has been criticised extra-judicially by Fennelly J. of the Irish Supreme Court, who has stated that:
-[i]t is apparent that the decision to decline jurisdiction to the Court of Justice is rooted in objection to the enlargement of the powers of the Court. It is difficult to see how the policy serves the presumed purpose…The most fundamental aspects of criminal procedure such as the burden and method of proof, the right to bail, trial by jury may be at stake…The absence of capacity to consult the Court of Justice may have the consequence that the Court of Justice is less likely to become aware of ... specific concerns‖.60
Ireland as a State has increasingly adopted an antagonistic stance at European level in recent times.61 How this new political relationship will impact on its domestic legal system in the realm of European matters remains to be seen, given the traditionally quite pro-communautaire stance adopted by the Irish judiciary, a stance that may be viewed through a different prism in the realm of arrest warrant law and practice.62
Conclusion
The Irish Supreme Court has arguably failed to -bridge the gap‖ between the domestic constitutional protection it is supposed to be affording to those subject to surrender pursuant to s. 37 and the Pupino interpretive obligation, shadowed by its inability to access the Court of Justice in construing an instrument that lacks direct effect. The force and utility of s. 37 appears to have been cast aside by the Irish Supreme Court in favour of full mutual recognition. Whether such a response is satisfactory in light of its inability to consult the Court of Justice as to the correct interpretation of the instrument, on so many practical points affecting liberty and fundamental rights and freedoms, appears to become more self-evidently not the case. The Pupino solution does not appear to be an adequate response to the Irish judicial dilemma. While the judicial protection that can be offered in the realm of the Third Pillar is questionable where the Court of Justice has such a truncated jurisdiction, the challenge remains for national courts, in Member States such as Ireland as Third Pillar guardians of fundamental rights, to truly -bridge the gap‖ effectively. 
